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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUCE C. JEPPSON and 
JEAN W. JEPPSOl-1, his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
UNITED TELEVISION, Il~C. , aka 
KTVX T . V . CHAi.\lNEL 4 , 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 15318 
This is an action by plaintiffs for alleged 
invasion of their right of privacy arising out of a telecast 
wherein an announcer from the defendant station called 
plaintiff Jean W. Jeppson on the program called "Dialing for 
Dollars," and a telecast of the telephone conversation was 
made. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintif~s' 
complaint on the grounds that it did not state a claim ur· 
, .. 
which relief could be granted. Written memoranda were fi;, 
by the respective parties and after oral argument, and ab 
taking the matter under advisement, the Honorable Dean E 
Conder granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff: 
complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the judgment 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The charging part of plaintiffs' complaint is se 
forth in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 10. For the convenience:: 
the Court, they are set forth herewith: 
"3. On or about March 2, 1977, at about 
3: 00 0' clock P. M. of said day, Defendant, throu; 
one of its agents telephoned the residence of 
Plaintiffs. Plaintiff, Jean W. Jeppson answere: 
the phone and a man's voice was heard and asked· 
this was Mrs. Jeppson, or the Jeppson residenc:. 
and Mrs. Jean Jeppson responded that it was: l:' 
the man stated to the effect, 'this is Dialing·· 
Dollars, do you have your T. V. set on?', to whi:_ 
Jean Jeppson stated, 'no I don't.' Then theag: 
for Defendant said, 'Oh, that is unfortunate . 
considerable emphasis) because you could hav~,':' 
$50. 00. ' Then Mrs. Jeppson said, 'well now ' ·· 
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tell you, I'd rather have peace in my home than 
all that garbage on television, even for $50.00.' 
Then the man laughed to some extent. Mrs. Jeppson 
then said, 'Thank you for calling.' Then she hung 
up the phone. 
"Within about one minute from the time 
Plaintiff hung up the phone the phone began to 
ring and continued to do so with calls for the 
rest of the afternoon for several hours from 
people throughout the state of Utah, all of which 
calls referred to the conversation that had taken 
place between Plaintiff, Jean W. Jeppson and the 
agent for Defendant. That said callers to Plaintiff 
were rude and abusive, obscene, threatening and 
harassing to Plaintiffs. 
"4. That more than a dozen abusive and 
harassing calls came to Plaintif!s in their home 
as a direct result of the conversation that had 
taken place between Mrs. Jeppson and the 
agent for the Defendant. In addition there 
have been numerous comments by friends and others 
that discovered, or learned, or heard of the 
conversation that has been embarassing and 
humiliating and caused Plaintiffs considerable 
outrage, mental suffering, shame and is an attack 
on their reputation and character. That in 
addition many of the crank calls that came to 
Plaintiffs on this matter have caused consider-
able unrest and fear, shock, and fright to 
Plaintiffs for their safety and well-being. 
"5. That Defendant through it's agent 
gave out over the air and over television the 
telephone number and name of Plaintiffs and 
furthermore carried out the conversation with 
Plaintiff, Jean W. Jeppson, over the air and on 
television without first informing Plaintiff that 
the same was going over television and throughout 
the state of Utah on the air." 
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"10. That Defendant in making its 
telephone call on television and over the air'· 
its program, Dialing for Dollars, with Plaintif: 
was doing so for purposes of advertising or ~; 
of trade in their [sic] broadcasting business.'' 
Plaintiffs brought their action in three counts 
(R. 2-6) The first cause of action was based upon a commc 
law theory of invasion of right of privacy. (R. 2-3) Tb 
second cause of action was based upon the Utah statutes 
dealing with the same subject. (R. 4) The third cause of 
action appears to be nothing but a separate claim for pun'.: 
damages arising out of the same acts as set forth in the 
first and second causes of action. (R. 4-5) 
Defendant attacked plaintiffs' complaint by a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. (R. 9-10) Both parties subrnitte: 
written memoranda in support of their respective positions 
(R. 12-29) After oral argument to the court, the motion 
taken under advisement, and subsequently granted. (R.30-J: 
Plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend, but stood upon the 
allegations of their complaint. This appeal followed. 
(R. 33) 
ARGUMENT 
Although plaintiffs have made separate arguments 
d starurn< under the theories of invasion of common law dn 
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right of privacy, we believe that the two points can best 
be considered together. 
An evaluation of the merits of plaintiffs' claim 
requires a review of the historical development of the tort 
known as invasion of the right of privacy. The initial 
history is well traced in Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed., com-
mencing at page 802. The author there said: 
. Prior to the year 1890, no English or 
American court ever had granted relief expressly 
based upon the invasion of such a right, although 
there were cases which in retrospect seem to have 
been groping in that direction, and Judge Cooley 
had coined the phrase, 'the right to be let alone.' 
In 1890 there appeared in the Harvard Law Review a 
famous article, by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis, which reviewed a number of cases in 
which relief had been afforded on the basis of 
defamation, invasion of some property right, or 
breach of confidence or an implied contract, and 
concluded that they were in reality based upon a 
broader principle which was entitled to separate 
recognition. In support of their argument they 
contended that the growing excesses of the press 
made a remedy upon such a distinct ground essen-
tial to the protection of private individuals 
against the unjustifiable infliction of mental 
pain and distress. " 
and on the next page the author continues: 
"The first state really to come to grips with 
the doctrine thus advanced was New York. After 
cases in its lower courts had accepted the existence 
of the right of privacy proposed by Warren and 
Brandeis, it fell into the hostile hands of the 
Court of Appeals in Robertson v. Rochester Folding-
Box Company, where the defendant made use of the 
- 5 -
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picture of a pulchritudinous young lady to ad•ier· 
its flour without her consent. In a four-to<i:, 
decision, with a vigorous dissent, the court 
flatly denied the existence of any right to pre:, 
against such conduct, because of the lack of 
precedent, the purely mental character of the 
injury, the 'vast amount of litigation' which 
might be expected to follow, the difficulty of 
drawing a distinction between public and private 
characters, and the fear of undue restriction o: 
liberty of speech and freedom of the press . 
. In consequence the next ::fow York legisla-
ture enacted a statute making it both a mis-
demeanor and a tort to make use of the name, 
portrait or picture of any person for 'advertis· 
ing purposes or for the purposes of trade' with· 
out his written consent. This act remains (he 
law of New York, where there have been upwards 
of a hundred decisions dealing with it. Except 
as the statute itself limits the extent of the 
right, the New York decisions are quite cons is· 
tent with the common law as it has been worked 
out in other states, and they are customarily 
cited in privacy cases throughout the coun-
try. II 
One of the first states to follow Hew York, was 
Utah which enacted a statute similar to the Jew York Act 
Sec. 76-4-8 and Sec. 76-4-9, U.C.A., 1953. Those statLJtes 
provided as follows: 
Sec. 76-4-8. "Any person who uses for adv': 
tising purposes or for purposes of trade, or u?'.: 
any postal card, the name, portrait or picture· 
any person, if such person is living, without .. 
first having obtained the written consent of 5"' 
person, or if a minor, of his parent or gu~rd~a:. 
or if such person is dead, without the wric;er._ 
' nveo 
consent of his heirs or personal representa 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
- 6 -
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Sec. 76-4-9: "Any living person, or the heirs 
or personal representatives of any deceased per-
son, whose name, portrait or picture is used 
within this state for advertising purposes or for 
purposes of trade, without the written consent 
first obtained as provided in the next preceding 
section may maintain an action against such person 
so using his name, picture or portrait to prevent 
and restrain the use thereof; and may in the same 
action recover damages for any injuries sustained 
by reason of such use, and, if the defendant shall 
have knowingly used such person's name, portrait 
or picture in such manner as is declared to be 
unlawful, the jury or court, if tried without a 
jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary 
damages." 
This Court construed the above-quoted statutes in 
Donahue vs. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 2 
Ut.2d 256, 272 P.2.d 177. That case involved a movie which 
contained a fictionalized account of the life of plaintiffs' 
decedent. Plaintiffs sued defendant on the theory that the 
moving picture was a commercial venture and that, therefore, 
the use of decedent's life history without consent of his 
heirs was a violation of the statute. The conflicting 
theories upon which the case was submitted to this court 
were set forth in the opinion as follows: 
"It is the plaintiff's theory that the 
use of a person's name or picture in any manner 
in which the profit motive is present comes within 
the meaning of the phrase 'for purposes of trade' 
as used in our statute and is proscribed by it; 
whereas defendant contends to the contrary that 
such a broad application of the statute, which 
- 7 -
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would interdict the publication of person's 
name or the portrayal of his character in news 
reports or any media of information which was 
operated for profit, such as newspapers, radio 
and television broadcasts, magazine articles, 
biographical sketches, historical accounts, 
novels, plays, etc., would so offend against 
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
speech and of the press that the statute if 
so interpreted would be unconstitutional. De-
fendants therefore argue that the statute was 
only intended to apply to actual advertising 
or the promotion of sales of a collateral com-
modity, which interpretation would obviate the 
difficulties as to its constitutionality. We 
are confronted with the question as to which of 
these contentions is correct. 
This court then reviewed the history of actions '. 
invasions of right of privacy essentially as set forth~ 
our quotation from Prosser. The court then quoted from the 
case of Rhodes vs. Sperry & Hutchinson & Co., 193 H.Y. 223, 
85 N.E. 1097, as follows: 
" . Such is the character of the right of 
privacy preserved by legislation protecting 
persons against the unauthorized use of their 
names or portraits in the form of advertise-
ment or trade notices. It is a recognition by 
the lawmaking power of the very general senti-
ment which prevailed throughout the colllll1unitY 
against permitting advertisers to promote th§. 
sale of their wares by this method, regardless" 
of the wishes of the persons thereby affected. 
(Emphasis added.) 
That case, construing the i~ew York statute, had 
been decided prior to the time that Utah adopted the Jew 
- 8 -
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York act and therefore, assumedly adopted the act with the 
construction placed upon it by the New York court. This 
court finally concluded as follows: 
"This leaves us two alternatives: First 
to give it a strict and literal application, to 
prohibit the use of a name, portrait or picture 
in any manner whatsoever, whether factual or 
fictional, in connection with any publication 
where a profit motive is present; or Second, 
the interpretation contended for by defendants, 
that the statute was intended only to prohibit 
the use of names, portraits or pictures in 
connection with advertising or the promotion 
of the sale of collateral items." 
In holding for the contention advanced by the 
defendant, this court said: 
.On the other hand, social considerations, 
the legislative history of our statute, and its 
context considered in the light of rules of 
statutory construction, all point persuasively 
to the conclusion that the interpretation con-
tended for by the defendant is that which com-
ports with the legislative intent." 
Since there is no allegation or claim that defendant's 
telecast was intended to advertise or promote "the sale of 
collateral items," it appears clear that under the law as it 
existed up to 1973, plaintiffs would have had no right of 
action under either the common law, or the statutes of this 
state· In that year, Sections 7 6-4-8 and 9 were repealed as 
part of a general revamp of the Utah Penal Code. They were 
- 9 -
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replaced by Sections 76-9-402 to 406 inclusive. Althou~ 
plaintiffs have referred to Sections 76-4-8 and 9 in thei: 
complaint, they apparently make no claim for them here, 
since they are not cited in their brief, and were repealed 
before the date of the telecast in question. The issue, 
therefore, is whether the newly enacted statutes 76-9-402, 
405 and 406 change the law as it existed in 1973, and creat; 
a cause of action which did not previously exist. 
Section 76-9-402 provides, insofar as material 
here, as follows: 
"76-9-402. Privacy violation. --(1) A per-
son is guilty of privacy violation if, except as 
authorized by law, he: 
(a) Trespasses on property with intent to 
subject anyone to eavesdropping or other sur-
veillance in a private place; or 
(c) Installs or uses outside of a private 
place any device for hearing, recording, ampli-
fying, or broadcasting sounds originating in the 
place which would not ordinarily be audible or 
comprehensible outside, without the consent_ of 
the person or persons entitled to privacy tnere. 
(2) Privacy violation is a class B misde-
meanor." 
A reading of this statute clearly indicates that 
. " allege•, it has no application to the facts of this case, a~ 
- 10 -
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in plaintiffs' complaint. There is no claim here that the 
defendant did anything more than call the plaintiff Jean 
Jeppson on her telephone and broadcast the conversation 
which took place. Certainly defendant did not trespass on 
plaintiffs' property. Subpart (c) clearly refers to a hidden 
microphone or other similar "bugging" device, and not to a 
telephone with a publicly listed number. 
Section 76-9-403 is entitled "Communication abuse" 
and has to do with the interception of telephone and 
telegraph messages, letters, or other means of private 
communication or divulging the content of such communica-
tions. It clearly has no application here. 
Section 76-9-405 provides as follows: 
"Abuse of personal identity.--(1) A person 
is guilty of abuse of personal identity if, for 
the purpose of advertising any articles of 
merchandise for purposes of trade or for any 
other advertising purposes, he uses the name, 
picture, or portrait of any individual or uses the 
name or picture of any public institution of this 
state, the official title of any public officer of 
this state, or of any person who is living, 
without first having obtained the written consent 
of the person, or, if the person be a minor, the 
written consent of his parent or guardian, or, if 
the person is dead, without the written consent of 
his heirs or personal representatives. 
(2) Abuse of personal identity is a class B 
misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.) 
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This is the Section which most closely resembles former 
Section 76-4-8. By its terms it is clearly limited to 
abuse of personal identity "for the purpose of advertisino 
·c 
any articles of merchandise for purposes of trade or for 
any other advertising purposes. The language of th2 
statute appears to embody fully the holding of this court 
in Donahue, that is, that to be actionable under the statuc, 
the broadcast must advertise or promote the sale of "coll-
ateral items." There is no allegation or even suggestion:: 
plaintiffs' complaint that any merchandise was being adver'.. 
in connection with the broadcast of which plaintiffs comp:, 
Section 76-9-406 merely provides a remedy for 
offenses committed under the previously discussed statutes 
The second cause of action fails to state a claim for an 
invasion of the plaintiffs' right of privacy under the Uta' 
statutes. 
We turn then to the question of whether plaintC 
have stated a claim apart from statute for a common law to: 
known as invasion of the right of privacy. As noted earL' 
in this brief, there was no common law right of action fo; 
invasion of the right of privacy prior to 1900. The righc 
· N y k Utari and was first recognized by statute in iew or .. 
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--
Vi:ginia followed with their own statutory enactments. In 
the period of the thirties, several states recognized a 
right of action for invasion of the right of privacy. Utah, 
so far as our research reveals, has never recognized the 
existence of such a right, other than as provided by statute. 
As pointed out by Prosser, there have been more than one 
hundred case decisions in -.:l'ew York interpreting its statute. 
Those cases have been accepted by other states as consistent 
with what the common law should be in the absence of statute. 
In short, there is no right of action for invasion of the 
right of privacy broader than that provided by the state 
statutes. 
It must be further observed that it is not the 
publication of any private matter which is actionable. The 
rule in this regard is well stated by Prosser at page 811, 
as follows: 
"The final limitation is that the matter 
made public must be one which would be offensive 
and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary 
sensibilities. The law is not for the protection 
of the hypersensitive, and all of us must, to 
some reasonable extent, lead lives exposed to 
the public gaze. Anyone who is not a hermit must 
expect the more or less casual observation of 
his neighbors and the passing public as to what 
he is and does, and some reporting of his daily 
activities. (Emphasis added.) 
- 13 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
To the same effect is Harper and James on The Law of Torts 
Section 9.5, pages 677 and 678: 
" .It is not every invasion of a privacy 
interest that is actionable, of course. The 
mere fact of living in a social order implies 
certain annoying contacts with others which 
even the least fastidious member of the 
community may on occasion resent. Neverthe-
less, such experiences are the price of social 
intercourse. It is only when these annoyances 
become unreasonable by offending against pre-
vailing standards of decency that the law takes 
cognizance of them. (Emphasis added.) 
and at page 691, Section 9.7: 
11 
.All will admit that some intrusions into 
one's personal life are so indecent and outra-
geous and calculated to cause such excruciat~g 
mental pain to all but the most callous that it 
would be a reproach to the law not to allow 
redress. On the other hand, it is equally clear 
that society cannot protect the neurotically 
thin-skinned against those trivial invasions 
of privacy which the normal person suffers with 
equanimity. The mores and the law must dis tin· 
guish the one from the other." (Emphasis added) 
Also to the same effect is Restatement of Torts, Section Ji 
Comment d: 
11 
•• On the other hand, liability exists onb.Y 
if the defendant's conduct was such that he 
should have realized that it would be offens~ 
to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is 
only where the intrusion has gone beyond the 
limits of decency that liability accrues· · · 
(Emphasis added.) 
Tentative Draft No. 13 of the Restatement of To:: 
Sec. 652B provides as follows: 
- 14 -
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"One who intentionally intrudes, physically 
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another, or his private affairs or concerns, is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable man." (Emphasis added.) 
As illustrative of a case supportive of this view, see Williams 
v. KCMO Broadcasting Division--Meredith Corporation, (Mo.App.), 
472 S.W.2d l. 
There was nothing indecent, vulgar, obscene, scanda-
lous, threatening, terrifying, or even of questionable taste 
in the telephone contact which plaintiffs allege defendant 
~ade with plaintiff Jean Jeppson, as set forth in paragraph 
3 of the complaint. The call was, at worst, a mild annoyance 
of the kind commonly experienced daily by nearly everyone 
having a telephone. Telephone surveys, telephone sales 
solicitations, telephone solicitations for charitable 
contributions, and even wrong numbers are annoying and 
irritating, but are of the type that the possessors of 
telephones must expect to experience. 
The real gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint appears 
to be not the momentary interruption in plaintiff's day by 
the telephone call initiated by defendant, but by a series 
of telephone calls which plaintiff allegedly received there-
after This defendant, of course, cannot be responsible for 
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the reactions of others to a telephone call which was 1·n·· nu~: 
initiated in the reasonable expectation that plaintiff wo; 
be pleased to be the potential lucky recipient of a fifty· 
dollar prize. Whatever animosity and adverse criticism 
plaintiffs received were apparently as the result of 11rs. 
Jeppson' s own acid comments to the broadcaster, and not 
anything stated by the defendant's announcer. 
Plaintiffs place great reliance on the provision; 
of FCC Regulation 73.1206. This regulation was not ple~ 
in plaintiffs' complaint. Assuming, however, that the m: 
may take judicial notice of it, we submit that this is a 
regulation designed to direct and control the conduct of 
radio business--not to create private rights of action fw 
individuals. The apparent purpose of the regulation is to 
prevent the inadvertent publication of objectionable m~~~ 
over the airways by a person not being aware that he is on 
the air. The right of action for invasion of right of 
privacy depends upon local statutory and common law--not 
federal regulations. 
Plaintiffs also rely strongly in the case of 
Froelich v. Adair, (Kan.), 516 P. 2d 993. That case is 
different on its facts, and therefore, of little persuas> 
- 16 -
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v~lue. However, the court there recog~ized the rule which 
we ~ave advocated here. In its syllabus No. 2 the court said: 
who said: 
--
"2. One who intentionially intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another, or his private affairs 
or concerns, is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable man." (Emphasis added.) 
See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Fromme, 
.The admitted facts of this case giving 
rise to the claim of intrusion of seclusion 
bring the case within the recognized limitation 
that no action exists unless the wrongful 
intrusion is such as to outrage or cause mental 
suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person 
of ordinary sensibilities. In Y2 of the syllabus 
the court holds: 
"'One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude 
or seclusion of another, or his private 
affairs or concerns, is subject to liabil-
ity to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable man.' [Emphasis 
added.] 
"The last phrase of this syllabus delimits 
such an action. Intrusion of seclusion to be 
actionable must be highly offensive to a reason-
able man. The common link uniting all of the 
cases which recognize the cause of action is 
the unwarranted, obtrusive and objectionable 
intrusion into the privacy of another. In this 
case the appellant admits (appellant's brief 
page 10) it is not the embarrassment potential 
of the information obtained, it is the intrusion 
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itself which the court should analyze to see 
if one's seclusion has been intruded upon. 
The character of the intrusion should determi~ 
liabilitity or non-liability. The degree of 
the mental anguish does not determine liability, 
only the amount of damages. 
"No court has said that every invasion 
of itself into another person's private quarters 
constitutes an actionable invasion of privacy. 
It is only when the invasion is so outrageous 
that the traditional remedies of trespass, 
nuisance, intentional infliction of mental 
distress, etc., will not adequately compensate 
a plaintiff for the insult to his individual 
dignity that an invasion of privacy action 
will lie. The intrusion itself must be patently 
offensive before an invasion of privacy action 
will lie. The totality of the intruder's 
conduct must be extreme, intentional and out-
rageous; the conduct must be so offensive 
that it would cause mental harm or anguish 
in a person of ordinary sensibilities. An 
invasion of privacy action should not be util-
ized to avoid the more stringent requirements 
of other torts designated to compensate an 
individual for physical or mental injury." 
In support of their third count plaintiffs rely c 
the article on Fright, Shock, Etc. in 38 Am.Jur.2d, PP· l-" 
This treatise demonstrates the lack of merit to plaintiffs 
claim. Thus at pages 3-5, ~l, the rule is announced as 
follows: 
"Although some forms of mental or 
emotional disturbances are recognized as 
real harm or damage, the well-established 
general rule is that liability may not be 
predicated upon the negligence of an actor 
- 18 -
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where the resulting damage is merely a mental 
or emotional disturbance. This general rule 
is applied where the mental or emotional 
disturbance is not accompanied by a bodily 
impact, and is not attended or followed by 
an injury to the person or body of the plaintiff, 
and where there is no other legal injury or 
cause of action, or other element of recoverable 
damages upon which a cause of action might be 
predicated. In such cases, the rule of 
damnum absque injuria has been said to prevail." 
And at pages 6-8, ~4 it is stated: 
"The almost universal view is that an actor 
is liable for a severe mental disturbance which 
he causes intentionally, or where the wrongful 
act or omission is wilful, wanton, or malicious, 
as distinguished from a wrongful act constituting 
negligence merely. Additional indirect authority 
in support of the view that there is liability 
for an intentional wrong which causes mental 
disturbance is to be found in the cases which 
state that there can be no recovery for a 
mental or emotional disturbance in the absence 
of any element of wilfulness, wantonness, malice, 
insult, abuse, or inhumanity. 
"Some authorities, in defining the inten-
tional tort, impose certain limitations or 
prescribe certain elements, such as that the 
actor must be guilty of 'extreme and outrageous 
conduct,' and that the conduct must cause 'severe 
emotional distress'." (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly defendant's motives were innocent. Far 
from desiring to cause plaintiffs any mental harm, defendant 
was only offering to them an opportunity for financial reward 
in a game which most persons would regard as fun. 
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COHCLUSION 
The allegations of plaintiffs' complaint wholly 
' fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted und::i 
the law of this state. It follows, therefore, that the juc 
ment of the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN & 
Ray R. Christensen 1 
Attorneys for Defendant and R<, 
i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Respondent's Brie: 1 
to: Gaylen S. Young, Jr. , attorney for Plaintiff and AppeL 
2188 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, this -i 
I 
I day of October, 1977. 
Secretary 
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